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INTRODUCTION 
The economic objectives that demand the consideration of State 
Authorities in any country, irrespective of the socio-political 
framework within which they are to be attained, could be reduced 
to two basic, generally conflicting, goals: Productivity and Distri-
bution. These policy goals aim to determine and guide to achieve 
the scale upon which goods and services are to be produced and 
how the continually formed aggregate output is to be shared. 
The distribution of the national product was regarded by David 
Ricardo 1 as the key to the comprehension of the entire economic 
mechanism .. Ricardo hoped that insight could be gained into the 
working of economic forces and their interrelationships by under-
standing the laws of distribution. Although progress on the theore-
tical level has been relatively slow in fulfilling Ricardo's object 
of search, yet on the practical level public policies must proceed 
as if the effect of different influences were precisely known. Policy 
ma king and decision on such matters are not an easy task; for the 
distribution of the national output can be affected according to dif-
ferent criteria. 
If productivity were chosen as the criterion for distribution, all 
members of the community would be limited to the income commen-
surate with their productive contribution to the total product; that 
is, . remuneration of each factor is made according to the value of 
its marginal product. 
However, a fair distribution would imply the principle of need. 
Yet distribution according to need alone would be inequitable be-
cause it would ignore the different individual contributions in 
productivity. Consequently, a reasonable combination of both cri-
teria is necessary. Functional distribution, based on productivity, 
lRicardo D. 'Works' ed. P.Scraffa (Cambridge University Press, 1951). 
Vol. 8, pp. 238-9. 
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must be transformed into personal income distribution reflecting 
need. 
The redistribution of national income is effected mainly through 
the tax-subsidy process of the State's budget. In achieving the 
de sired pattern of income dispersion the State creates the real con-
frontation between the fundamental policy goals of production and 
distribution. In a relatively developed industrial community, the 
forces directed towards production succeed if the different produc-
tivities of individuals are reflected in corresponding remuneration 
differentials. Assuming that innate talents are randomly dispersed 
but that some individuals for various reasons, not least the social 
structure, are in a more favourable position than others for per-
forming highly remunerative activities, it follows that inequality of 
distribution of income - and the concomitant distribution of wealth 
- would result. 
Yet, within a social system there are forces which are intent 
upon income equalisation; although' these are prepared to accept 
the fact that distribution measures aiming at more equal distribu-
tion do affect the efficiency of production in more than one way. 
The net outcome is expected to depend upon the relative strength 
of those factors operating through the tax schedules and social wel-
fare programmes that tend to reduce a person's incentive to produce, 
and of those elements within the same tax-benefits mechanism that 
are inclined to increase the 1 eve! 0 f personal activity and output 
per unit of man-hour through improving the individual and social 
well-being, thereby raising willingness to produce as well as the 
aspirations for a better life. 
This underlying issue points at the necessity to evaluate a pub-
lic scheme within a general framework and to account for both the 
short and the long run. It provides the backgro'und for this paper's 
discussion of the necessity to reconsider the basic approach to 
public welfare programmes."in Malta. For, 'at times, the general im-
pression could be formed that thinking over the structure and im-
plementation of the .public budget is compartmentalised, with plans 
to stimulate or accelerate production rates and the level of employ-
ment developed independently of welfare programmes. 
This paper sets down the key attitudes towards social welfare 
as reflected in the 1971 electoral programmes of the two major 
political parties in Malta. It defines what the proper aims of public 
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assistance should be and, through a brief analysis of two welfare 
schemes, it suggests that there exist inherent forces leading to the 
incompatibility of a scheme's objectives arising, in part, from the 
failure to give due account to the cost side while proposing the 
set-up of new or modified assistance plans. Finally, it puts for-
ward an idea that .could be studied about the approach in State as-
sistance; it points out that schemes based upon 'universalist' 
principles could lead to the failure of attaining otherwise feasible 
objectives if a more selective aid programme were to be followed. 
In the absence of intensive research on various social problems 
and upon the best means of financing different solutions, schemes 
are bound to be formulated, at best, upon approximations of the real 
situation; and, at worse, upon outright hunches that would bear no 
relation to the true state of affairs. However, in both cases the im-
portant determining factor in carrying out a social welfare scheme 
remains the availability of public funds. Often, the money set aside 
for specific schemes tend to be residual in nature; the attitude 
being that aid would be increased if, and only if, funds could be 
found after the payment of unavoidable commitments in administra-
tion and development projects. 
SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMMES IN POLITICAL PARTIES' PROGRAMMES 
The 1971 election manifestoes of the two major political parties 
in Malta outline their policy principles. 2 Both parties are intent to 
extend the 'Welfare State,3 through a more diversified assistance 
network, in cash or kind, to households and individuals. Income re-
distribution is thereby acknowledged to represent a fundamental 
factor for social stability and economic progress. One party bases 
its programmed work and social activity upon the belief, among 
others, that it is 'the obligation of a developed community not to 
tolerate avoidable hardships that could arise for the people be-
2 The Electoral Programme of the Malta Labour Party (henceforth EPMLP): 
'Malta Maltija fil-Paci u I-Progress'. 
The Electoral Programme of the Nationalist Party (henceforth EPNP): 
'Frott tal-Hidma - Nirnxu 'I Quddiem'. 
3 The term 'Welfare State' eludes exact definition. However, it is taken 
here to refer to the creation of a society in which every citizen is pro-
vided by the State with services that ensure economic security forhimself 
and his family. 
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cause of the excessive inequality between the rich and the poor', <4 
The other party recognises as it s greatest achievement ' .•• the 
progress towards a uni-class society: middle income group'. 5 
To translate such ideals and aspirations into every-day life, the 
two parties proposed to further the provision of public housing con-
struction,to introduce family allowances, to legislate a national 
minimum wage and to set up a national health insurance. 6 It ought 
to be presumed that such measures are directed to assist those 
who are in need: the sick, the aged, the low-income groups, cate-
gories of workers liable to be 'exploited' and the children of 
parents who fail, or are unable, to insure their households against 
disease and unemployment. Mo'reover, such assistance would be 
forthcoming from the community because it is recognised that par-
ticular households or individuals are unable to improve their social 
conditions on their own without the aid, in cash or in kind, from 
the State. 
Cost estimations are nowhere given. It is therefore pertinent to 
point out that the limit to public expenditure is ultimately set not 
by policy but by revenue, not by politicians but by taxpayers. It 
seems that cost awareness is not effective with the result that the 
financial estimates of a scheme tend to be reduced to secondary 
importance. Thus, whereas both parties are prepared to restructure 
the contributory national insurance scheme to introduce relevant 
relationship between premiums and benefits - a step which inevi-
tably had to be taken, - family allowances seem destined, if and 
when introduce'd, to be applicable 'universally', that is, paid to all 
households irrespective of the recipient's income. Similarly health 
insurance premiums are foreseen to be made compulsory .for all 
households, the lesson from the inadequate funds in the National 
Insurance scheme appears, so far, to have gone unheeded. 
Implied within such social welfare plans is the idea that some-
how people are expected to act collectively as taxpayers, yet as 
beneficiaries of State services citizens are supposed to regard 
themselves as individuals. Such an illusion, if it exists, cannot 
last long, not in a relatively closely-knit community like the Mal-
4 EPMLP p.15, n.3. 
5EPNP par.23. 
6 Yid. EPMLP p. 11 f, g, h, i. 
EPNP par.16, 18. 
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tese where development programme s setting out to restructure the 
sectoral pattern of production could dictate the absolute level of 
wages and salaries that would establish beyond the reach of the 
greater majority the (ideal' standard of living. Besides, it is 
through 'the claiming by the State of what presumably must be a re-
latively sizeable portion of an average weekly wage in indirect ta-
xation and national insurance contributions that the social welfare 
programme can be run. 7 
The optimal way of implementing a general welfare programme is 
to assist those in need and to let those who can help themselves. 
The lower the number of people assisted, given funds available, 
the higher would be the benefits for every household; similarly, the 
more widespread are public benefits, the more costly would a 
scheme turn out to be once the 'quality' of a 'public service is 
determined. Any welfare scheme, existing or about to be introduced, 
need to be considered within the framework of the general demand 
for relatively limited pUblic funds. The isolation of a scheme for 
assessing its respective feasibility in terms of social costs and 
benefits could render it fairly attractive, only to lead to financial 
supporting problems once in operation and incorporated in the 
general economic set-up. It would be very difficult for any Public 
Administration to discontinue public programmes once the State, for 
any reason, commits itself to provide a service. 
POVER1Y: DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT, AND ALLEVIATION 
That assistance should go to the (needy' is a fairly simple 
statement to make. But to define who the (needy' are is a complex 
issue; for the term 'need' or 'poverty' is not easily defineable for 
policy purposes. 
If 'poverty' is defined as inadequate income relatively to higher 
incomes, it turns out to be ineradicable: it would merely signify 
7 An estimate of the incidence of indirect taxes on families in various in-
come strata could only be made after the data on household budgetary 
survey carried out by the Government in 1971-1972 is published. However, 
it. could be assumed tliat since indirect tax revenue amounts to about 60% 
of Public funds ra ised locally, and since indirect taxes are a priori 
labelled regressive, then it follows· that the contribution by households in 
the lower and lower-middle income groups appear to be contributing to a 
substantial share of government expenditure. It is difficult, however, to 
specify the range of this contribution. 
44 
that the distribution of talents and capabilities, innate or acquired. 
is not distributed equally among all individuals - as noted already, 
this results in an unequal earning potential. 8 If 'povS!J:ty' is trans-
lated to mean absolute inadequacy of the material conditions judged 
desireable and acceptable by a community - subject, therefore, to 
an upward transformation reflecting economic growth and the ex-
pected concomitant improvements in tastes and social conditions -
it can be abolished by the redistribution of income. 
A similar dichotomy is followed in the statistical valuation of 
the 'poverty limit' computed with the objective of distinguishing 
the poor from the non-poor. The estimate could be set in both 
absolute (fixed) and relative terms. 
Policy makers in Malta have failed to declare the 'official' ab-
solute poverty standard,9 defined as the command over goods and 
services for consumption per period of time. The result of this 
omission could be illustrated by an example from the Non-contribu-
tory Old Age Pension Scheme (OAPS). Three different annual 
levels of income could be considered as absolute poverty lines. 
Data for 1973 would suggest the following levels for a single 
person: 
(i) £M65.63 - the limit to personal income which disqualifies an 
individual from having his finances supplemented 
under the OAPS. Since no financial assistance is 
envisaged for a person whose income exceeds the 
above level, one must assume that the amount is 
sufficient to subsist. 
(ii) £M164.58 - the amount guaranteed under the OAPS when the 
recipient's own income is zero; this amounts to 
8Research on income distribution in the United States of America has led 
to che formula tion of a hypothes is tha t the eq ua 1 opportunity for educa tion 
and training - recommendable on ethical grounds - could possibly lead 
to unwarranted results: instead of being egalitarian, spreading opportuni-
ties for education, combined with an increase in the general level of 
training, will increase the dispersion of earnings. 
See: Reder M: 'A Partial Survey of the Theory of Income Distribution' (in 
Sol tow L. ed. 'Six- Papers on the Size Distribution of Wealth and In-
come' -National-Bureau of Economic Research, 1969). 
9 See Rote A.W. 'State Provisions for old age in Malta' (in 'Economic and 
Social Studies' Vol. I, 1971 - R.U.M.). 
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about two and a half times the sum indicated in (i) 
above. 
(iii) £M19S.0S - the annual funds guaranteed to a person whose 
income does not exceed £M31.50 per annum. 
Under the National Assistance Act, the 1973 level of income per 
year (i.e. own income plus assistance) envisaged for a single per-
son household amounted to £M165, corresponding, therefore to (ii) 
above. 
The relative standard of poverty is defined as the level of income 
less than one half the median family income. lo Unlike the absolute 
standard, the relative standard also provides a measure of the de-
gree of inequality existing in the lower half of the income distribu-
tion. For whereas a fixed standard is independent of the shape of 
the income· distribution, the location of the relative poverty line is 
determined by the shape of the lower half of the distribution. 
Using data collected by the Department of Economics, Royal 
University of Malta, in 1971 for other purposes than estimating in-
come distribution, the relative poverty line for that year is estima-
ted to have been £M252.40c (i.e. half the median income £504.S0c). 
The absolute poverty standard for the same period for a couple 
could be either £M65.63 or £M227.54,S or £M25S.94,S under the 
OAP S when both husband and wife are entitled to assistance; or 
£M1S3.90 for a two-person household under the Social Assistance 
Programme. 
A tentative classification of the category and amount of families 
whose incomes fell below the relative standard of poverty is sup-
plied in Table 1. 
The classification below should, of course, be considered solely 
as a first approximation to the magnitude of the problem; about 12 
per cent of the households would be classified as 'poor' by this 
definition. Provided that the statistical data at hand represent the 
real situation, Table 1 would indicate: 
0) the degree of positive skewness in the distribution pattern of 
income in Malta; 
lOWith positively skewed distribution, the mean value is disproportion-
ately influenced by the very few high incomes at the upper end of the dis-
tribution; therefore it is not as suitable a measure of the centre of the 
distribution as is the median. 
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Table 1 
AMOUNT AND CA TE GOR Y OF FAMILIES WHOSE INCOME 
FALLS BELOW THE RELATIVE POVERTY LINE 
IN MAL TA - 1971 
CATEGORY NUMBER OF FAMILIES 
Single: Old Age Pensioners 7445 (a) 
Couples: Old Age Pensioners 1155 (a) 
Registering for Work: Married 1846 (b) 
Widowed 
(Male & Female) 44 (b) 
10490 
Note: Ca) Department of Social Services 
(b) Department of Labour. Data is for December 1971. 
(ii) the social pressures that are bound to be both psychologically 
and financially demanding upon those families striving to keep 
up even with the minimum standard of decency in this time and 
community; 
(iii) the other matters that become entangled in the poverty issue 
e.g. the urgency to prolong rent control legislation; 
(iv) the increasing burden upon public finances as overall social 
conditions - housing, education, recreation facilities, personal 
consumption demand - keep on rising unchecked. As always, 
demand for public facilities is bound to exceed supply unless 
prices are adjusted to regulate it. 
It becomes important, therefore, to establish the official poverty 
limit or range. Whichever statistical approach is accepted, con-
tinuous research in household budgetarty compositions and house-
holds' attitudes towards welfare programmes-cum-tax or opportunity 
cost payment need to be undertaken. 
Households could fall within the 'poverty range' of the income 
distribution spectrum either because their income per period of 
time or averaged over several successive time periods, is inade-
quate; or because they misspend it. For example, people might not 
spe'ad enough on housing, education, medical care or insurance for 
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the maintenance of income in sickness, unemployment or old age. 
In particular, myopic and irresponsible behaviour of the parents 
wo~d be witnessed on their dependent children. Or, even though 
certain households want to allocate realistic proportions of their 
family budgets they could not afford to provide for the basic ser-
vices at the current market prices. 
Welfare programmes should, therefore, distinguish between a 
'static' view of poverty and a 'dynamic' view. A short-run prog-
ramme can be based on a static view: see who constitute the 'poor' 
now and try to help them. So, if non-contributory old age pension-
ers are in great need, following, say, rapid increases in prices of 
th~"se commodities consumed mainly by such group, they would be 
given preferential treatment. 
A long-run programme mu"st proceed from a dynamic objective; it 
must consider how people become poor and how they might escape 
poverty. It would become essential to provide work for all those 
who want it; and to ensure that the financial remuneration would be 
enough to enable a man to live decently and in moderation (admit-
tedly difficult to define). At the same time a system would be in-
troduced whereby income supplement programmes would not inter-
fere with the work incentives.ll 
Long-run programming would integrate various activities of the 
Public sector: National economic planning; the provision of train-
ing and retraining opportunities to facilitate labour mobility as 
economic conditions would demand from time to time; assessment 
of welfare programmes following the evaluation of income with-
drawals in taxation - both that raised on income and on consump-
tion - and the supplement in cash or kind that accrues to benefi-
ciaries from public welfare schemes. Aid should be distributed to 
specific categories of households whenever administration of 
schemes permits it. 
In addition, decision would have to be reached on the form aid 
should assume: a subsidy to supply, or a subsidy to demand, or a 
11 Viewed within this framework, the setting up of the Pioneer Labour 
Corps in 1973 could prove a temporary solution provided it succeeds in 
giving Public Planners time sufficient to guide the economy through 
achievin"g long-term oriented industrial - s.ervice .set up, and provided it 
prepares the workers psychologically to work" in a different structured 
economy geared to production an<;l sales. 
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a combination of both. To evaluate the benefit acctuing from sub-
sidising supply of commodities, one needs to possess fairly ac-
curate information about the consumption patterns of households in 
different income strata; once consumption patterns are known the 
value of 'disguised transfer payments' in the form of supply sub-
sidies could be discovered. Only then could a decision be judi-
ciously reached; it would be learnt whether the people who need 
most State assistance are actually getting it in a higher proportion 
than those who, because of a better financial position, are con-
sidered less eligible for Government's help. Results from such 
studies could be socially embarrassing. 
Demand subsidies are explicit; assistance is provided following 
means-testing and beneficiaries could be more easily identified. 
Such aid could take the form of direct cash payments or vouchers 
(coupons) to be exchanged for specified purposes. The main ad-
vantage of demand subsidies is that, given appropriate considera-
tion to work incentive, it would lead to a lower burden on State ex-
penditure for assistance purposes if work-creating programmes 
achieve their targets. As the conditions of a household (in terms of 
income, size or prolonged illness) change, allowances would 
change as well. The unidentifiable supply subsidies do not permit 
this degree of adjustment in State welfare programmes. 
By way of illustration, consider the provision of public housing 
and its allocation. The costs for construction and related ameni-
ties are determined by market prices; imputed rent on capital out-
lay could be estimated accordingly. The Housing Department nor-
mally rents public apartments at a subsidized price to those house-
holds that qualify for them. Once the rent is determined, it would 
not be altered. This procedure is tantamount to a permanent trans-
fer payment equivalent to the difference ·between the economic and 
the actual rent. It should not follow, however, that because a 
family was in need in a given year, it would still require assis-
tance "in the future. Through the .combined provision of public 
housing supply and a demand subsidy, Public Authorities would 
not only ensure low-cost quality housing but, in principle at least, 
still retain the possibility of making the family bear a larger share 
in the financial bur<kn for rental once its commitments become 
less. 
In order to appreciate fully the importance of the relationship of 
Public provision, economic pricing, and demand subsidy, the role 
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of prices in a market system need understanding. Pricing would not 
conflict with public schemes currently operating in Malta nor with 
some of those that are planned to be some day introduced. A com-
ment on the role of prices in an economy seems therefore appropri-
ate. 
PRICES: A RATIONING DEVICE 
Prices are one of the means of rationing a limited quantity of a 
good or a service; they ought to reflect costs, in terms of real re-
sources, search-effort and time, for both suppliers and potential 
consumers. A price enables an individual to decide whether he 
wants to participate in a transaction or not: income, tastes, ur-
gency (i.e. the intensity of need to purchase or to sell) would con-
dition the willingness of a seller or a buyer to realise an exchange 
of goods. 
Market transactions are said to function through the 'exclusion 
principle': a consumer must pay for the acquisition of commodities 
he desires; failure to pay excludes the consumer from obtaining a 
good. However certain commodities do not fall under this 'principle 
of exclusion'; they are said to provide the economic rationale for 
state provisions (as distinct from the more fundamental political 
argument for State intervention in the ownership and provision of 
goods). 
As a rule, public provision should be restricted to those goods 
and services that are in joint supply - where consumption by one 
citizen does not reduce the amount available for the rest of the 
community - and commodities that produce 'externalities' - so 
that social costs and benefits diverge from private costs and bene-
fits. Pricing would not be relevant for the distribution of such 
goods and services; hence the argument for 'free' state provision 
through general taxation. 
However State intervention may also be undertaken to satisfy 
those social wants that are considered 'm.eritorious' of State sub-
sidisation. Such wants, while subject to pricing and satisfied in 
part by the private sector, are provided for through the public bud-
get, over and above what is provided through the market and paid 
for by private buyers. 
If price fails or is ruled out as a distributive device, other 
means would have to be introduced. Rationing of supplies could be 
effected according to age, sex, social group, or status, to limit the 
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list. It should be understood that public production and/or public 
provision need not imply 'free' distribution. Although public edu-
cation is 'free' for those who want it, housing and pasteurised milk 
are not. This distinction should not be allowed to confuse the 
Issues. 
A 'zero pricing' policy is usually supported on the grounds of 
externalities or fairly inelastic demand schedules for goods pro-
vided through the State's budget. Critics of such procedure argue 
that zero. pricing tends to distort the pattern of demand for a good 
or service and could give rise to over-supply: with zero price the 
amount demanded is expected to exceed any other amount subjected 
to a price greater than zero. 
It is also argued that schemes relying on zero pricing, fully 
backed from general taxation or public loans, tend to undergo a 
deterioration in the quality of a service as financial costs rise 
over time. The undesired results are said to be reflected in the 
time lost in waiting with long lists of patients for hospital treat-
ment; obsolete public buildings; overcrowded classes in schools; 
and heavy annual subsidies to meet shortages in funds for social 
security payments. The universal introduction of a pUblic service, 
with zero or subsidized price, appears to lead to such situati ons. 12 
This paper argues that wherever possible the pricing mechanism 
as a rationing device should be implemented. It is also agreed that 
the level and pattern of a household's consumption cannot be 
separated from its income and maintenance burden. The dual pur-
pose of giving meaning to price and effecting an income distribution 
that would enable families to attain the socially desireable living 
standards could be met by extending demand subsidies. The prob-
lems and side-effects of implementing such policies are now 
analysed. This is done through the assessment of Public Housing 
Policies and the National Insurance Scheme as administered in 
Malta over the past years. 
PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAMMES 
A simple hypothetical example could best illustrate the situation. 
Assume throughout that it costs £M2300 to construct an apartment; 
12 For illustration of such a thesis see the works on Social $ervices pub-
lished by the Institute of Economic Affairs in Britain and 
Friedman M: 'Capitalism and Freedom' (University of Chicago Press, 
1962). 
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rent is estimated at 6 per cent per annum Le. rental amount to 
£Ml38; the apartment is leased at u\170 per annum - i.e. at an an-
nual subsidy of £M68; omit the maintenance liabilities that fall on 
the State as owner. 
The allocation of public housing apartments operates through a 
'points system'. The weight a household's application is given 
depends upon the household's age structure - the size and com-
position of a family - its economic means and, if any, the struc-
tural and sanitary condition of its present residence. Family size 
and age are positively related to points allocation; financial means 
are negatively related; while a present small apartment in bad con-
ditions would raise a household in the priority list. Such a system, 
equitable in principle, would determine that at a given time a 
family could claim priority to public housing and would be preferred 
to another household in 'better' conditions. 
Certain points arise. First, the procedure leads to the formula-
tion of a decision and stops. It does not follow up the effects of 
that decision for the system does not permit changes in rent de-
manded (£M70) from a household when conditions change, for ex-
ample, children start working or the parents win a large sum of 
money. The subsidy going to this family (fl.,168 on our assumptions) 
will be permanent and tax free. A particular household is helped 
because at a given date it required assistance; the State inter-
venes and provides it with aid in the form of subsidised housing 
service. By u'1e same reasoning, if conditions change for the better, 
the community, through the Public Authorities, ought to make the 
household help itself and pay a greater contribution for its housing 
i.e. the annual subsidy will be reduced from its original £M68. In 
this manner, the burden on public funds would be to the same ex-
tent lowered and the funds channelled for other purposes, including 
the assistance to those families, that would require help at that 
future date. 
Moreover, al though prima facie the system favours the large 
family with low income and living in inadequate housing, it could 
occur that such a family, precisely because of these same condi-
tions that place it high in the priority list, ,would not afford to pay 
even the subsidized price. This means that if such a family is to 
be housed in the new building its income would have· to be sup-
plemented either direcdy or indirecdy through a further reduction 
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in annual rent. If the additional subsidies are not forthcoming, 
another household that falls lower in the priority list would be 
given the new apartment. The result observed in the preceeding 
paragraph would follow: perennial subsidy to the tenant. The 
family that ought to have been assisted in the first place would be 
relatively placed lower in the social scale with little hope of im-
proving its housing problem; because it is poor and possessing no 
collateral, and a scheme of pUblic insurance of funds borrowed for 
housing construction to meet cases of default is not available, such 
a family could not hope of raising a loan from a housing finance 
company. 
In addition, so long as public housing rentals are not kept in 
line with the imputed rents on capital outlays, home ownership 
schemes in pUblic housing apartments could not achieve their ob-
j ectives. It is evident, of course, that there would al ways be 
people who prefer to own their home. But if market interest rates 
do not fall below the 'rental rate', and knowing that households' 
income will increase over time while rents contracted either remain 
static or are adjusted only after a long lag (revised every 50 years, 
for example) it does not appear economically worthwhile to pur-
chase a State-owned apartment. The tenant secures subsidised 
housing service and retains his capital in any other form but not 
own housing and thus gains the freedom of choice in consumption. 
It is agreed that the value of real estate tend to be flexible up-
wards over time; but it is also true that a £1.170 rental, twenty 
years forward from a given date would represent a lower burden 
upon a tenant. In order for public home-ownership schemes to ma-
terialise on the extent envisaged, thus creating a revol ving fund 
for future projects, the rent charged should approximate the econ-
omic rent level,13 thus rendering it worthwhile for a tenant to own 
the apartment. Pricing, reflecting cost, would recondition current 
demand for housing service and other goods and modify future 
plans for the same commodities. 
An anomaly thus prevails: Public Authorities have repeatedly 
attempted to encourage tenants in Public housing estate to become 
owners but, unwittingly, have withdrawn the major incentive that 
13 By 'economic rent' is meant the total rent tha t buildings should theo-
retically receive to cover such elements as maintenance and operating 
costs, debt service costs and return on investment. 
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could contribute towards achieving this objective. At the same 
time, those households that ought to have benefited in the first 
place have not done so; the advantages from pUblic schemes ac-
cruing to those households considered 'less' deserving. 
A remedy to this situation could be found by the introduction of 
full economic rent pricing in public housing estates and a housing 
allowance to fill the 'rent gap' i.e. the difference between the 
economic and the actual rent. In this way, through overall econo-
mic planning aiming and achieving increases in real household in-
come, the rent subsidy element could be adjusted to a family's 
conditions; there would arise an incentive for home-ownership, at 
least for terraced housing estates built by the State, and those 
families that need assistance would get it. 
The solution is not without hazards; legal, ethical as well as 
financial problems demand careful study. Such a solution could be 
introduced at once in the renting of new apartments. But, to be 
equitable, it would have to be extended economy-wide; it should 
regulate both the public housing apartments already rented and 
those privately owned. It would be required to draw up plans of 
how to implement the policy without interfering with legally bind-
ing contracts and avoiding. unnecessary litigations and potential 
social unrest. The existing housing legislation, amended over the 
years to meet specific objectives deemed recommendable at the 
time, has created different species of tenure and thus rendered a 
simple solution impossible so long as individual freedom is to be 
respected. 
In addition, the injected freedom in the housing market 14 would 
produce changes in the distribution of income and wealth as a 
result of higher rents and a more diversified home-ownership. The 
tax-subsidy mechanism could be used to finance and rechannel 
funds from one sector to another; for example, part of the rent in-
crease could be directly clawed back to provide the base for 
housing allowances. In so far as subsidies are related to house-
hold's income the increase in rent, if necessary, would be either 
fully borne by the tenant - at one extreme - or fully paid by the 
Government - at the other end, with the private landlord, where 
14 In reality different markets for living apartments could be distinguished 
by locality and size. The term here is used to cover the various markets. 
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relevant, contributing a set share equal to the clawed-back housing 
rate. If such tax 'earmarking' prove to be too complex to adminis-
ter, and to fall back upon the concept of income as distinct from 
income-sources as the base for assessment, the income tax-subsidy 
structure could be so devised as to render the required funds for 
overall government expenditure, while providing an instrument for 
checking on private consumption. 
The distribution of the housing 'burden' among tenants, land-
owners and the State would reflect the socio-political conditions of 
the time. But the approach described would introduce cost-aware-
ness; it would make explicit the direction of the flow of real re-
sources; it would unfreeze the housing market and add a further 
degree of freedom to public policy procedures. 
THE NATIONAL INSURANCE SCHEME 15 
The social insurance scheme implemented in Malta turns itself 
into a mechanism for income redistribution between different groups 
in so far as the value of annuities to which persons become en-
titled when they enter the scheme is not closely related to the 
weekly in'stalments paid. Two major kinds of redistribution could 
be identified: (i) From some retirement pension beneficiaries to 
others; 
(ii) From the general tax-payer to the Scheme bene-
ficiaries. 
(i) Since its inception in 1956, the scheme's main objective has 
been to secure citizens of a reasonable income when they attain 
the 'legal' age of retiring from work; also it aimed to compensate 
for the then practically non-existing sickness benefit schemes in 
the private sector. Some entered the system relatively young; 
others entered it at an advanced age. This means that a person 
who contracted-in at a young age would pay more than the one who 
entered the system late in life and, in theory, could barely satisfy 
the minimum requirements for entitlement to benefits. 
The income subsidy is not intended to help solely those in need, 
but is paid to beneficiaries independent of their poverty or wealth. 
Consequently, there does not appear to be any justification for this 
redistributive element. 
lSSee Rote A.W. op. cit. pp.15 et seq. 
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(ii) The system is not self-financing. 16 This deficiency appears 
wherever such schemes are introduced. Once the fund has gone 
bankrupt, the weekly contributions would have to be raised and 
the annual funds required to keep the system in operation would 
normally have to be provided. from Government's current tax re-
venue. The system appears to be self-financing during the period 
when instalments are being paid and few quality for the benefits. 
But this appearance is misleading for it neglects. the obligations 
being accumulated with respect to the persons paying the tax. The 
fund becomes overburdened with claims for benefits to meet condi-
tions of unemployment, sickness or retirement from work. 
Once again there appears to be no proper justification for help-
ing a man just because he is 61, especially when the tax-payer is 
called in to provide the annual deficit in the fund. 
16 Vid. The Budget Speech for fiscal year 1972-73. The Minister of Fin-
ance states: 
'A commitment which we have to a large extent already provided for and 
which we feel it is imperative that the country should provide for is the 
need of building up again the National Insurance Fund to an acceptable 
level so that it can again become a sure means of safeguarding the 
worker's .interest. Indeed ••• we have already provided a subvention for 
£M1.2 million in 1971-1972. We again feel that the public purse should 
make a significant contribution also in 1972-73 and to this end provision 
has been taken for a subvention of £M600000 .• .'. 
At the presentation of the Government Budget for 1973-74, the same 
Minister once again takes up the subject and comments: 'My Government 
is not prepared to pass on to future genera dons of insured pers ons the 
burden resulting from inadequate contributions. In the circumstances, 
taking into account the advice of the Actuaries, my Government had de-
cided to raise the contribution rate payable by each party in respect of 
adult employed person (employer and employed person) from 27c5 to 45c 
per week and to raise all other contribution rates proportionately. 
These higher National Insurance payment will in effect .mean an ap-
preciable increase'in the Government's support to the scheme. In fact the 
State 'contribution will go up by £M713,000 per annum while the Govern-
ment's contribution as employer will increase by £M202,000 per annum, 
making a total of £M915,000'. 
In the Budget for fiscal year 1974-75, the contribution ra tes were 
raised once more: for employers and employees the rate increased from 
45 cents to 60 cents 'wee kly; for the self-employed the' ra te became 
£M1.08,5 instead of 82 cents per wee k. 
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It is evident that the premiums paid are not sufficient to cover 
the present value of the annuity especially when it is definite that 
cost-of-living allowances to compensate for the rise in prices of 
consumer goods would be introduced at a flat rate in the future, 
This signifies that irrespective of the sum they have been nomin-
ally insured for, beneficiaries would certainly recoup on retirement 
higher returns than the amounts hoped for, apart from the benefits 
accruing during their working life. 
The benefits from the scheme, then, are independent of income; 
distribution is equal for all insured. • Contracting-in' , however, is 
not optional; as a result the uniform contribution turns out to be a 
regressive tax: the lower one's income, the higher the percentage 
taken away by the State in social security contributions. Other 
results that ensue from the running of this scheme include: 
- the reduction in the number of claimants for the Old Age Pen-
sion; to the extent that the scheme succeeded in making people 
think about the need to insure themsel ves against loss of in-
come,it produced an educational means for responsible citizen-
ship! 
- The scheme could be regarded as a partial refunding of income 
taxation by providing a subsidized form of insurance. The annual 
household's savings, post-tax, are to this extent higher than they 
would otherwise be if the equivalent future annual income had to 
be secured through saving with a private insurance company. 
- Government's commitments to honour claims for a scheme that is 
not self-financing - when it could be made so - reduces funds 
that could either be used for general public programmes or for 
selective assistance to those in 'need'. 
The experience obtained from the running of the national in-
surance scheme should serve as a guide when deciding about the 
necessity and the strucrure of the proposed National Health 
Scheme. The projections of costs as much as benefits; and the 
identification of potential bearers of costs and potential bene-
ficiarie·s must be determined. The effective beneficiaries and 
bearers of costs may turn out to be different from the nominal. 
SUBSIDIZE DEi\1AND OR SUPPLY? 
The two public schemes discussed suffice to emphasize the ne-
cessity to reconsider the general approach to Social Welfare Prog-
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rammes. Public funds are relatively restricted; if assistance is to 
include quality in addition to quantity, the universalist 'free provi-
sion for all' principle would have to be narrowed to only few ser-
vices. Whenever schemes are planned, W.~e primary approach should 
be based on a pricing criterion. 
Debate has been going for some time among economists about 
the validity of the proposal to meet inefficiencies that follow from 
'unregulated' household income distribution by introducing a Re-
versal Income Tax (RIT) - a scheme based upon the principles and 
procedures of an income tax system but extending them downwards 
below the tax-free level to provide an increasing annual grant for 
the poor households. 17 
The idea is simple and surely equitable in principle; however 
the introduction on an economy-wide scale of such an integrated 
tax-subsidy scheme not only involves difficulties in administration 
but also could be financially heavy. The scheme would turn the 
household, as distinct from the individual, as the unit of assess-
ment for both tax liability and benefit assistance: tax or assis-
tance are determined by whether a household's income exceed or 
fall below stipulated levels. 
A RIT can take several forms; but whatever its structure it must 
meet certain basic considerations, including, the provision of fully 
adequate help to the poorest, the opel'ation of maximum selectivity 
in concentrating help on the poor, the preservation of the incen-
tives to produce and the keeping of cost to a minimum in tax levied. 
Any scheme introduced would probably fail to meet all of these as-
pects; it will surely represent a compromise and the choice must 
rely upon the relative weights given to these considerations, which 
may be conflicting or complementary. 
Of special importance is the incentive aspect. 18 A transfer pay-
17Yid. Muscovitch E. 'Income Supplements - How high Should they be?' 
Anderson P.S. 'Pros, Cons and Some Alternatives' 
(both papers in 'New England Economic Review' - Federal Reserve Bank 
of BO'ston -:- January/February 1971). 
Christopher A. et al 'Policy for Poverty' (Institute of Economic Affairs -
1971 ). 
Atkinson A.B. 'Policies for Poverty' (LLoyds Bank Review Number 100 
- April 1971). 
lSYid. Musgrave R.A. 'The Theory of Public Finance' (Mc Graw Hill 
1959) pp. 251-254. 
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is likely to render people better off than they would otherwise have 
been .. So on the assumption that the effect of the additional income 
is a stronger demand for leisure, people will work less hard. Be-
sides, if the scheme IS such that benefits diminish as income 
rises the substitution effect will al so be adverse to work incen-
tive. The restrictive element on incentive would presumably be 
stronger as the loss in benefits corresponding to income increase 
is relatively large i.e. as the implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) 
rises,19 the disincentive on additional effort increases. 
This set-back could be remedied by introducing a scheme where-
in a reduction in social benefits is less than proportional to in-
creases in oWl) income - set the IMTR to less than - 100 per cent. 
Such results could be achieved by classifying assistance to meet 
different degrees of 'welfare': a minimum income guarantee rela-
ted to a 'poverty level'· and additional allowances to meet specific 
purposes, for example, housing, education or social insurance. 
The minimum income guarantee would be determined after asses-
sing family needs by size. Assistance would automatically be 
given to those households whose income per period, or averaged 
over several periods, is less than the established level. Such a 
scheme would incorporate the notion of children's allowances 
since the minimum income level would be related to different fa-
mily sizes. Moreover it would render the need to declare a national 
minimum wage unnecessary; trade unions and wages councils 
would be in a more suitable position to assess the absolute levels 
of wages in different industries. 
The minimum income guarantee plan concerns itself with the 
basic welfare requirement of a family. Added to it would be speci-
fic allowances to meet certain goods and services that satisfy 
'merit wants'. 
Tab! e 2 presents a hypothetical example of a 'multiple scheme' 
that attempts to meet the criticisms raised against the schemes 
now in use. ·It sets a minimum income ·level; frees the market for 
particular services; enables the Public Authorities to reduce sub-
sidy as income and/or family size change; introduce conscious-
ness in costS, thus tending to restrict citizens from insisting for 
19 The implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) is defined as the reduction in 
social compensation following marginal increments in own income. 
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set in the table renders them irrelevant. It is intended to illustrate 
how welfare programmes could incorporate the incentive to work 
element and pricing in public provided services. The MIG, con-
sidered on its own, implies a marginal tax rate of 100% - for each 
additional £Ml in own income, there would be a £Ml reduction in 
public assistance. However changes in Net Income could still be 
advantageous to the household if the aggregate allowances are not 
correspondingly reduced in a 1: 1 ratio~ Reduction could be in-
troduced proportionwise but less than one. 
Suppose that allowances are reduced in a 1:0.5 ratio - for each 
increase in own income above £M510 of £Ml (to take MC + 4 chil-
dren case an illustration) credlts would be reduced by 50c. In this 
way, the household would still be receiving benefit s until own in-
come reaches £M970. The graaual decline in assistance as own 
income rises is shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
WELFARE PLAN WITH AN IMTR OF 50% - MC + 4 CHILDREN 
ALLOWANCES 
GiANGE IN (HOUSING + CHANGE IN OWN INCOME TOTAL INCOME 
, ' OWN INCOME ALLOWANCES 
EDUCATION 
510 230 710 
600 +90 185 -45 785 
700 +190 135 -95 835 
900 +390 35 -195 935 
970 +460 
-
-230 970 
Note: Personal Income Tax is not relevant for a household under 
above income and size conditions. 
A weekly wage of £MI0 would satisfy the basic requirement of 
the scheme - own income would be £M520 per annum. The Public 
Exchequer wOuld be assisting a family to meet the other 'socially 
desireable' needs while ensuring selectivity of assistance. Re-
sentment on the part of those household units which would be re-
quired to contribute towards public services c()uld be reduced once 
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it is understood that the quality of the services could be raised; 
that there would be freedom of choice in 'consumption'; that other 
goods and services would be produced through the State expendi-
ture once a proportion of costs for specific services would be 
covered; and that tax rates could remain unaltered even though 
pUblic expenditure increases. 
Such . a scheme would not prove frictionless to introduce. Ad-
ministrative problems could be expected to centre on two main 
items: 
(i) the form assistance would take: cash or vouchers. 
(H) the introduction of economy-wide means testing and what 
should be included as the basis for assessing 'income' (i.e. 
the flow of resources per period). 
The system, as dichotomised above, could adopt both ap-
proaches: use cash to build up the gap between household's own 
income and the minimum income level; introduce vouchers to meet 
the cost of services included in the scheme. Through this proce-
dure, both the objectives of the individual and the Government 
would be met: a household is guaranteed a minimum amount of re-
sources to be disposed of as desired; it would also be guaranteed 
financial assistance to be spent on specified goods if it qualifies 
for it. 
The application of regular general means-tests for all house-
holds could be. both expensive and irritating for the household. The 
use of the income tax return could, however, facilitate work by 
providing a classification of those types of households that are 
expected to fall within the assistance category. In a small com-
munity like Malta assessment should not prove an insurmountable 
obstacle. Data is already available, in part at least. What would 
be essential is the integration of information about each household 
that is probably available in dispersed form in different Govern-
ment Departments. 
The main emphasis would be on the basic level of income and 
how to enable households have control over an annual income flow 
through opportunities for work. The basic distribution of income 
derived from ownership of resources is in part the outcome of long-
term economic planning; enterprises that would guarantee remune-
ration adequate to meet with minimal discomfort a moderate way of 
life would be encouraged. 
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CONCLUSION 
Finding solutions for welfare problems is time-consuming. But 
the first indication that an awareness of the difficulties exists is 
the continual assessment of the schemes introduced in the past. 
The modifications that would be considered essential would reflect 
the planning horizon of Public Administrators and the extension of 
consciousness within a community of the fact that resources need 
to be created before they can be distributed. 
The objective of this paper is to highlight the important aspects 
of income distribution plans. It does not attempt to measure poten-
tial impacts on aggregate activity of different distribution policies. 
It suggests that even at this stage when public officials are pre-
occupied with development, certain steps could be taken that will 
enable future administrations to regulate more efficiently the then 
relevant economic and social situations. 
The main idea put forward is that whenever possible public as-
sistance should subsidise demand; if public provision is con-
sidered optimal, then demand subsidy would complement public 
supply and thus 'free' the market. Demand subsidization assumes 
the establishment of different minimum income levels reflecting 
the desired value of goods and services that households, of dif-
ferent sizes, require in a modern community. 
Data about the ranges on income and the consumption patterns 
could only be obroined after intensive research. Whatever income 
levels are suggested in the examples above should be considered 
as purely illustrative. The principle must be accepted first; the 
details will be completed after. 
63 
